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Abstract This paper aims at putting forward viewpoints
regarding the use of stability technology to prevent and control
cascading outages by examining recent blackout events. Based
on the inquiry reports of the 2011 Southwest America blackout
and the 2012 India power blackouts, event evolution features
are first summarized from a stability perspective. Then a
comparative analysis is conducted so as to propose suggestions
of effective measures, either preventive or emergency, which
could have avoided the blackouts. It is shown that applications
of several mature technologies can create opportunities of
preventing or interrupting the cascading development. These
include offline dynamic simulation, online stability analysis
and preventive control, real-time situational awareness and
automatic emergency control. Further R & D directions are
given to address the challenges of modern power systems as
well. They cover system fault identification criterion of pro-
tection and control devices, verification of adaptability of
control effect to system operating conditions, real-time oper-
ational management of emergency control measures and
improvement of simulation accuracy.
Keywords Cascading outages, Blackout, System
collapse, Stability technology, Protection and control
1 Introduction
Major blackouts are rare, and no two blackout scenarios are
the same. Severe blackouts in modern power systems, often
with catastrophic consequences, were usually caused by a
cascading development of emergency situation with system
collapse as the final result. A cascade occurs when there is a
sequential tripping of numerous transmission lines and gen-
erators in a widening geographic area [1], often with one event
or state leading to another in a cause and effect manner [2].
Any occurrence of real blackout events always draws
attention to the issue of power system stability and at the same
time provides invaluable source information for assessment of
stability technologies. This paper takes the 2011 Southwest
America blackout and the 2012 India power blackouts as
examples for analysis. On the afternoon of September 8, 2011,
an 11-minute system disturbance occurred in the Pacific
Southwest and affected parts of Arizona, Southern California,
and Baja California, Mexico, leading to cascading outages and
leaving approximately 2.7 million customers without power
[3]. All of the San Diego area lost power, and it took 12 h to
restore 100 % of its load. The India power blackouts on the
30th and 31st of July in 2012 followed the same pattern of fast
cascading evolution, resulting in collapse of Northern
Regional Grid with a load loss of 36 GW and collapse of
Northern, Eastern and North-Eastern regional grids with a
load loss of 48 GW respectively [4].
Although no single factor was responsible for these
blackouts and weak grid structures as well as lack of
coordination of system management and operation were
key causes of failing to prevent cascading outages, this
paper focuses on aspects which are closely related to sta-
bility technology for prevention and control of cascading
outages. Although each event has a distinct feature, all
these events share some common characteristics. A com-
parative study can therefore reveal control measures that
are effective for all events as well as control measures that
are effective only for each individual event.
The post-event analysis of all the above-mentioned
blackout events showed that the system concerned was not
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being operated in a secure N - 1 state. However, this did
not prevent the inquiry reports from giving detailed in-
depth cause analysis and recommendations [3, 4]. Based on
the inquiry reports, this paper concentrates on presenting
both advanced but mature stability technology applications
and fundamental measures necessary to be strengthened,
aiming to provide reference for both industrial practice and
academic research.
2 Event evolution features
A brief summary of the sequence of events for each
exemplar case is given below to clarify the mechanisms of
cascading evolution and analyze potentially possible ways
of prevention and control of system collapse.
2.1 The 2011 Southwest America blackout [3]
A schematic structure of Southwest power grid is shown
in Fig. 1, which consists of Imperial Irrigation District (IID)
grid, San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) grid, Arizona
Public Service Co.(APS)grid, Southern California Edison
(SCE) grid, Comisio´n Federal de Electricidad (CFE) grid
and Western Area Power Administration—Lower Colorado
(WALC)grid. There are three parallel transmission corri-
dors through which power flows into the area where the
blackout occurred. The first transmission corridor consists
of a single 500 kV Hassayampa–North Gila line (H–NG), a
major transmission corridor that transports power in an
east–west direction. The second corridor is Path 44 which
includes the five 230 kV lines in the northernmost part of
the SDG&E system that connect SDG&E with the San
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS). The third
transmission corridor, shown as the ‘‘S Corridor’’ on Fig. 1,
consists of lower voltage (230, 161 and 92 kV) facilities
and feeds power to WALC and north IID.
The loss of the H–NG 500 kV line (taken as 0 s) initi-
ated the event. Power flows instantaneously redistributed
throughout the system, increasing flows through IID 92 kV
and 161 kV systems to the north of the southwest power
link and creating sizeable voltage deviations and equip-
ment overloads. Significant overloading occurred on three
of IID’s 230/92 kV transformers located at the Coachella
Valley (CV) and Ramon substations, as well as on Path 44.
The flow redistributions, voltage deviations, and resulting
overloads had a ripple effect, as transformers, transmission
lines, and generating units tripped offline, initiating auto-
matic load shedding throughout the region in a relatively
short time span.
Fig. 1 Schematic structure of Southwest power grid in USA
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For instance, in 37.5 and 38.2 s, IID’s CV transformer
banks No. 2 and No. 1 tripped by overload protection
relays; in less than 5 min, IID’s Ramon 230/92 kV trans-
former tripped leading to local voltage collapse and fol-
lowed by automatic under-voltage load shedding, multiple
generator tripping and line tripping in IID’s northern 92 kV
system; in about 8 min, WALC’s Gila 161/69 kV trans-
formers tripped due to time-overcurrent protection; in
about 9 min, the Yucca 161/69 kV transformers 1 and 2
and Pilot Knob-Yucca 161 kV transmission line tripped by
overload protection followed by tripping of the YCA
combined cycle plant on the Yuma 69 kV system, has-
tening the collapse of the Yuma load pocket; in 10 min, the
El Centro-Pilot Knob 161 kV line tripped by Zone 3 pro-
tection isolating the southern IID 92 kV system onto a
single transmission line from SDG&E-the S Line, forcing
all of the remaining load in IID to draw through the
SDG&E system and pushing the aggregate current on Path
44–8,400 amps, well above the trip point of 8,000 amps,
and 3 s later, the S Line RAS at Imperial Valley Substation
initiated the tripping of two combined cycle generators at
Central La Rosita in Mexico driving Path 44 flow to about
9,500 amps, and another 4 s later, the S Line RAS tripped
the S Line itself creating an IID island leading to load
tripping mostly in its southern 92 kV system.
Just seconds before the blackout, Path 44 carried all
flows into the San Diego area as well as parts of Arizona
and Mexico. In less than 11 min after H–NG tripped, the
excessive loading on Path 44 initiated an intertie separation
scheme at SONGS, which separated SDG&E from Path 44,
led to the loss of the SONGS nuclear units, and eventually
resulted in the complete blackout of San Diego, CFE and
Yuma grids.
2.2 The 2012 India power blackouts [4]
A sketch of India power blackout event evolution is
shown in Fig. 2. The India power grid consists of five
regional grids, namely Northern (NR), Western (WR),
Southern (SR), Eastern (ER) and North Eastern (NER)
grids. SR grid is connected to ER and WR grids through
asynchronous links, and the remaining four regional grids
operate in synchronism.
The characteristics of pre-disturbance system conditions















































The first islanding 
interface on July 31
Fig. 2 Sketch of India power blackout event evolution
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weakened by multiple outages of transmission lines in the
WR–NR interface and effectively the 400 kV Bina-Gwal-
ior-Agra line was the only main AC circuit available
between WR–NR interface with high loading due to power
overdrawn by some of the NR utilities. Triggering events
of the two blackout events were the same, i.e., tripping of
400 kV Bina-Gwalior line by its zone-3 protection of dis-
tance relay due to load encroachment (taken as 0 s).
The WR–NR power transmission interface tripping
immediately led to such an emergency state: there was a
sudden large power imbalance between the sending WR
grid and the receiving NR grid and the NR loads were met
through WR–ER–NR route which was not purely AC
transmission lines but a complex long-distance network
consisting of generators, lines, transformers, distribution
feeders, customers and so on. As a result, fast relative
motion between WR generators and NR generators led to
loss of synchronism and out-of-step oscillation. The system
was then split by line tripping near the oscillation center
due to operation of line distance relays.
In the July 30 blackout, the oscillation center was in the
NR–ER interface and in 4 s the corresponding tie lines
tripped, isolating the NR system from the WR–ER–NER
system with a power imbalance of 5,800 MW. The NR grid
system collapsed due to under frequency and further power
swing within the region. The WR-ER system survived
without any further splitting within the WR-ER grid due to
tripping of a few generators in this region on high
frequency.
In the July 31 blackout, the oscillation center was in the
ER, near ER–WR interface, and in 6 s, a small part of ER
(Ranchi and Rourkela), along with WR, got isolated from
the rest of the NR–ER–NER grid with a power imbalance
of 3,000 MW. Power deficiency in the NR–ER–NER grid
led to multiple tripping of lines and generators attributed to
internal power swings, under frequency and overvoltage at
different places. In 1 min, the power swing in the NR–ER
interface resulted in further separation of the NR from the
ER–NER system. Subsequently, all the three grids (NR, ER
and NER) collapsed. The WR system, however, survived
due to over-frequency generator tripping.
In both blackout events, the SR system, which was
getting power from ER and WR, survived after automatic
under-frequency load shedding (UFLS) and HVDC power
ramping.
2.3 Comparison of the blackouts from a stability
perspective
The above-mentioned cases have some similarities.
Systems in all events were operated in an unsecured N-1
state prior to the initial disturbance. The cascading pro-
cesses were triggered by the tripping of a key transmission
interface and developed as a result of power flow rerouting
and inadvertent operation of protection or control devices.
Therefore, preventive control measures would have effec-
tively avoided the cascading outages. (Table 1)
The most prominent difference is the speed with which
the cascade evolved. In the 2011 Southwest America
blackout, it was a relatively slow process with equipment
overloading as the main stability problem. There did exist
opportunities for interrupting the cascading development
with the assistance of proper technology. In the 2012 India
power blackouts, however, triggering event and subsequent
events happened so fast and the interrelated stability phe-
nomena were so complex that the only effective measures
seemed to be either preventive control in normal operating
state or emergency control immediately after the first event
occurrence.
3 Self-evident stability technology applications
It is quite obvious from analysis based on the event
inquiry reports [3, 4] that applications of some mature
technologies should be very effective for prevention and
control of cascading outages, as summarized and empha-
sized below.
3.1 Offline dynamic simulation
A deep and thorough system study is the most funda-
mental measure for secure system operation, and offline
dynamic simulation studies should be carried out in order
to grasp the system characteristics under different grid
conditions and anticipated scenarios.
While the inquiry report of the India blackouts calls for
the formation of a task force to study the grid security
Table 1 Comparative analysis of characteristics and control
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issues, that of the Southwest America blackout lists in
detail quite a few key findings and recommendations in this
respect. For instance, in various time-scale system studies
including long-term, seasonal, day-ahead and online ana-
lysis, many relevant power companies did not reflect
external grids and lower voltage level grids in a sufficiently
detailed and accurate way in their computer simulation
models, resulting in a lack of understanding of dynamic
mutual influence among different regions and voltage
levels. This in turn led to problems such as not sharing
study results and real-time information with neighboring
grids, inappropriate relay settings of low-voltage facilities
and so on. In addition, Western Electricity Coordinating
Council (WECC) did not perform the required review and
assessment of all NERC-defined Special Protection Sys-
tems (SPSs) in their areas. This serious negligence of
mutual influence between stability control systems and
system dynamics made it impossible to grasp system
dynamics appeared during the cascading process or to
determine proper control measures.
Therefore, whether it is offline study, online analysis or
real-time monitoring, all facilities that impact bulk power
system reliability should be covered, which should be
selected not by geographic location, voltage level or
functional classification but by deep understanding of
system characteristics.
3.2 Online stability analysis and preventive control
Since the 2003 North America blackout [1], there have
been extensive activities worldwide in research, develop-
ment and application of online stability analysis techniques
[5–8], a result of the necessity of assessing system security
and making control decisions based on actual operating
conditions.
Unfortunately, the India control centers did not have any
analytical tool to periodically conduct an assessment of the
system security condition and the state estimator results
were not quite reliable [4]. Deployment of dynamic secu-
rity assessment (DSA) has been listed as one of the
recommendations.
In the 2011 Southwest America blackout case, real-time
tools of the affected grids were inadequate and nonopera-
tional when needed to provide early-warning information
and preventive control decisions. For instance, if IID’s
DSA system had identified in advance the impact of H–NG
line tripping and given preventive control suggestions, the
operators could have taken action before the line tripping to
adjust the system condition and thus the overload tripping
of CV transformers could have been avoided so that the
cascading evolution could have been interrupted at its
initial stage. In addition, if IID’s DSA system had alarmed
the operators that on that day, total power flow of the two
CV transformers was at such a high level that only pre-
ventive control measures could have avoided overload
tripping of the second transformer upon the tripping of the
first, the operators could have dispatched additional gen-
eration to alleviate the transformer loading to avoid the loss
of both transformers. Moreover, if IID had in its DSA
system modeled its neighboring network using APS’s
complete topological model with real-time measurement
data instead of a highly simplified equivalent model of
pseudo-generators plus tie lines, the DSA could have
assessed the impact of a sudden loss of H–NG on its power
system before it actually happened and IID could have
taken proper preventive control actions before the H–NG
line tripped.
3.3 Real-time situational awareness
The importance of network visualization ability was
recognized and emphasized by the inquiry committee of
the 2012 India power blackouts, as strengthening the
communication network, ensuring reliability of data at load
dispatch centers and deploying WAMS were put forward as
recommendations [4].
In the 2011 Southwest America blackout, changes in
power flow and voltage magnitude as a result of H–NG line
tripping were noticed by affected power companies but
many control centers were unable to know in real time the
causes and impacts of these changes because of not having
adequate situational awareness of their neighboring sys-
tems. The result was inability to take action or even mis-
judgment of the event evolution trend.
In the post-event analysis of the September 8th blackout,
phase measurement unit (PMU) data proved extremely
valuable in constructing the sequence of events and vali-
dating simulation results. However, PMUs did not play a
part in observing system behaviors in real time. For
instance, tripping of the H–NG line led to the increase of
phase angle difference between voltages of the two ter-
minals. Post-event simulation showed that this angle dif-
ference exceeded APS’s synchro-check relay setting of 60
degrees and re-dispatch of a significant amount of gener-
ation was required to reduce this difference to the accept-
able value. Without situational awareness of the real-time
value of this phase angle difference, WECC and California
Independent System Operator(CAISO)were informed by
APS that the line could be quickly reconnected. If PMUs
were used to monitor the voltage angle difference between
two ends of the tripped line, the time required to reclose the
H–NG line would not have been wrongly estimated and
WECC probably would have taken action to reduce loading
on Path 44 to prevent its automatic tripping.
During the fast cascade stage, inadequate situational
awareness led to inability to take timely emergency control
268 Yongjie FANG
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measures. Neither the operators’ monitoring nor the auto-
matic alarming of Path 44 power flow exceeding the limit
was correlated to SONGS separation scheme, which was a
lack of real-time early warning against the effect of this limit
violation. Otherwise, the automatic operation of the SONGS
separation scheme could have been prevented by earlier
emergency control actions such as manual load shedding.
3.4 Automatic emergency control
It is interesting to note that the inquiry report of the 2012
India power blackouts [4] is of the opinion that after loss of
about 5,000–6,000 MW to Northern Region, had the UFLS
relays operated, the grid could have been saved but the
report of the 2011 Southwest America blackout [3], much
more detailed and thorough, shows that the post-event
simulation analysis could not explain why UFLS perfor-
mance could not have prevented the SDG&E system from
frequency collapse.
In fact, all the blackout events showed that equipment
along the power flow rerouting path during the dynamic
process could be tripped by protection relays earlier than
UFLS actions. Therefore the cascading development such
as successive islanding could not possibly be interrupted by
solely depending on the distributed control measures such
as UFLS. Moreover, the emergency control problem should
be formulated as that of the blackout defense mechanism in
case of sudden loss of a key power transmission interface
which although was a single transmission line in all the
above cases. Therefore, the primary control objective
should be to prevent cross-grid rerouting of large power
flow and the follow-up uncontrolled equipment tripping
and system islanding, and automatic generator tripping and
load shedding triggered by the event of a sudden loss of
transmission corridor is the most effective emergency
control measure to prevent similar cascading outages. The
economic rationality of deploying this type of emergency
control can be analyzed from the point of view of risk
reduction.
Even at the later stage of cascade, this could be also
effective for preventing collapse of the islanded system and
reducing loss of load. For example, active load shedding
triggered by Path 44 tripping signal would have been such
a measure.
4 In-depth reflections on further R&D directions
From the point of view of system operation, those listed
in the previous section are mature technologies to enhance
protection against cascading outages. However, in face of
the increasing scale, complexity and flexibility of modern
power systems, several fundamental measures including
further R&D efforts should be taken to ensure the effec-
tiveness of technological measures.
4.1 System fault identification criterion of protection
and control devices
It was common that in blackout events, many Zone 3
distance protection relays perceived by mistake the current
and voltage conditions due to load encroachment or system
oscillations as line fault. Also, it is still not clear whether
ineffectiveness of UFLS schemes had something to do with
the device operation criterion. All these deserve further
studies.
In addition, in modern power systems, the AC system
fault characteristics can be severely impacted by adjacent
HVDC links or renewable energy source injection together
with its complex control systems. Traditional fault identi-
fication criterion is based on AC measurements and should
be reviewed so as to prevent protection and control devices
from unintended operation or failing to operate as a result
of being unable to adapt to new system characteristics.
4.2 Analysis of mutual influence between control logic
and system response
Even if protection and control devices can properly
identify system fault scenarios and operate correctly
according to predesigned logic of device-level or local grid
level, the concept of integrity of system stability should be
always borne in mind and thus the device operation logic
should be taken as an integral part for grasping global
characteristics of the system as a whole, in order to perform
coordination among different control actions and between
control action and system dynamics.
It is clear from the blackout cases that offline simulation
studies failed to predict such complex system behavior and
so much uncontrolled equipment tripping. As more and
more strong interconnection in modern power systems
leads to ever-increasing cross-regional influence of pro-
tection and control operation, mutual interaction via system
responses and coordination among distributed and inde-
pendently operated protection relays or regional emergency
control systems must be stressed. This is to prevent system
real-time responses provoked by local control actions from
going beyond the scope of offline studies and pre-designed
control logic, thus avoiding the passive situation of
uncontrolled equipment tripping.
4.3 Verification of adaptability of control effect
to system operating conditions
It can also be seen from the blackout cases that there
could hardly be any records of correct active control
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actions during the cascading evolution. Even if the fault
identification criterion and control logic are appropriate
judged by the locally measured system conditions, the
flexible system state changes can still make the pre-speci-
fied control actions have deficient, excessive or even
unintended or undesirable effects. One analogy is the
totally different location of the oscillation center of the
India system dynamics on 30 July from that on 31 July
2012.
Therefore, adaptability of control effects of the protec-
tion and control actions to the actual system operating
condition should be verified in an online environment and
once there is any problem, the system operating state
should be adjusted or the automatic control decisions
should be refreshed according to the online analysis results
[5, 6]. In this way, control measures can be both proactive
and orderly in case of system emergency.
The typical time needed to complete one round of cal-
culation is 5–15 min in the current on-line DSA system and
the contingency list normally contains only N - 1/N - 2
scenarios. Therefore,adaptability of control effect can be
assessed only when the power system reaches a relatively
stable condition after the already occurred disturbance and
before the happening of another pre-specified disturbance.
It needs further consideration how to include in the con-
tingency list scenarios of cascading nature which best
reflect the most up-to-date system state.
4.4 Real-time operational management of emergency
control measures
The 2012 India blackouts revealed that practically there
was no load relief from defense mechanisms like UFLS,
which was a natural result of violation of the various sys-
tem security related standards and power companies’
attention solely on overdrawing from the grid.
Therefore, measures to ensure stability control’s effec-
tiveness in system emergency should not limited to safe-
guarding reliability of control devices on the grid side
through operational maintenance, and real-time monitoring
and management should be extended to control execution
terminals on the generation and load side such as moni-
toring available quantity of generator tripping or load
shedding in order to guarantee sufficient control effects
once necessary. To this end an effective management
mechanism is necessary and functional authority of dis-
patch control centers for adjusting inappropriate control
measures should be ensured.
The centralized management function of stability con-
trol system can be further elevated to more advanced
function such as real-time correlated monitoring. For
instance, correlated monitoring of power quantities (such
as Path 44 loading) and operation logic of control systems
(such as SONGS separation scheme) can be implemented
to give timely warning about effects of control system
operation as a result of grid operation state changes.
4.5 Improvement of simulation accuracy
Simulation is the fundamental tool in various stages of
grid planning, system operation analysis, protection and
control decision-making, online DSA, post-event analysis
and so on. Each occurrence of large disturbance in actual
power systems provides an opportunity for checking
accuracy of simulation via actual system responses.
Analysis in the inquiry report of the 2012 India black-
outs is rather qualitative because of insufficient field data
records and lack of detailed post-event simulation study
results.
The inquiry report of the 2011 Southwest America
blackout gives examples of insufficiency of system simu-
lation models in reproducing the actual event. For instance,
it was unable to predict either the tripping of the SONGS
generation units or the collapse of SDG&E and CFE sys-
tems by using WECC dynamic simulation models for near-
term and long-term planning purposes. In the post-event
simulations the SDG&E system should have been pre-
vented from frequency collapse by the UFLS operational
performance, which was quite the opposite of reality. Only
by further addition of recorded details of the actual event to
the system model, including UFLS activation programs and
automatic switching logics of capacitors, did the simulation
results of the islanded region become better aligned to the
actual event following operation of the intertie separation
scheme at SONGS. In addition, the impedance value of
IID’s CV transformers was 0.1 per unit in WECC’s plan-
ning model but 0.05 per unit in its DSA model. As a result
of this difference, there was an error of approximately
16 % of the CV transformer loading in the online DSA
calculation result compared to the result obtained using the
planning model. This demonstrates the importance of data
and modeling accuracy as CV transformers were such key
facilities during the event evolution process.
There were large deviations of grid voltage and fre-
quency from nominal values in all the blackout cases,
particularly at the final stage of cascading development.
Whether simulation algorithms can appropriately deal with
abnormal excursions of voltage and frequency should also
be reviewed.
5 Conclusions
The 2011 Southwest America blackout and the 2012
India blackouts are used as examples to form the discussion
in this paper. Through analysis of system behavior and
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event evolution causes of these two events, the study shows
that opportunities of interrupting the cascading failure can
be found in various stages, whether they belong to pre-
ventive or emergency control technologies.
In order to use stability technologies to prevent and
control cascading outages, it is important to construct a
power system security defense infrastructure based on
advanced conceptual design. However, to ensure the
effectiveness of technological measures during cascading
evolution process, several fundamental measures need to
be strengthened first. These include a complete, thorough
and timely understanding of system dynamic characteris-
tics, system fault identification criterion of protection and
control devices, analysis of mutual influence between
control logic and system response, verification of adapt-
ability of control effect to system operating conditions and
improvement of simulation analysis.
Centralized generator tripping and load shedding auto-
matically triggered by the event of sudden loss of a
transmission interface is the most effective emergency
control measure for prevention of cross-grid rerouting of
large power flows, uncontrolled equipment tripping and
successive grid islanding. To ensure the dependability and
reliability of control effects, operational management of
stability control measures should be strengthened and
authorization for control centers to adjust these measures
should be guaranteed.
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